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Abstract 
Several studies on the banking sector have shown that Islamic banks are more financially 
robust and stable compared to conventional banks, mostly in periods of financial crises. The 
aim of this research is to measure and compare the level of stability between Islamic 
and conventional banks in Saudi Arabia using quarterly data. The sample covers around two-
thirds of banks operating in the Saudi stock market, and data comprises the last global 
financial crisis. The panel data model shows that Islamic banks relatively reduce the financial 
stability index; meanwhile, they contribute efficiently to enhance financial stability through the 
diversification of their assets. According to our findings Riyad Bank and SAMBA positively 
impact the financial stability, while Al-Rajhi bank has a positive but moderate role in enhancing 
the banking stability. As well, the Saudi banking sector exhibits a weak competitiveness which 
negatively impact the banking stability. Consequently, the limited presence of Islamic banks 
in the Saudi banking sector menaces any efforts to improve the financial stability.    
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1. Introduction 
Financial crises are mostly linked to financial and banking systems, along the international 
financial liberalization sector, where a domestic financial system is no longer isolated from 
changes of the global system. Islamic banks (IB) were first established during the last decade 
of the twentieth century and has since had a growing role in the international financial system. 
General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI, 2010) indicated that 
“total world Islamic finance reached around one trillion U.S. dollars by the end of 2009”.    
During the last financial crisis (2007-2009), a large number of conventional banks (CBs) 
around the world announced their bankruptcy (140 U.S. Banks in 2009);3 however there were 
no reports that showed any Islamic bank declared bankruptcy. The logical question to ask is; 
are Islamic banks immune from financial shocks? If so, can this be explained by the free-
interest system? Or is it because Islamic banks do not invest in derivatives, “Tawaruq” and 
loans sale?4 (Siddiqi 2000, Hassan 2006). In other word, could the immunity of Islamic banks 
against international financial crises be due to its incomplete integration into the global 
financial system?  
Studying the stability of Islamic banks requires the distinction between banks according to 
the structure of their assets. Firstly, Islamic banks adopted single layer Mudarabah, where they 
mobilize their liabilities directly into diverse investment opportunities.5 This model has been 
confronted by lots of operational risks. Consequently, Islamic banks have switched to the use 
of multi-layers Mudarabah Islamic model, i.e., Mudarabah of assets (sources) and liabilities 
(uses), where all assets are financed through Profit Loss Sharing system (PLS). 
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the Saudi Islamic banks, compared to 
conventional banks, are relatively less vulnerable to global financial crisis. The financial and 
banking system are often threatened by risks that could lead to financial crises. Banking sector 
could be a major driver of financial crises or one of the channels transmitting the impacts of 
the crises to other financial sectors and real economies. The historical data of Saudi banks (see 
Figures 1 in Appendices) and the support by the Saudi Arabian monetary authority (SAMA) 
indicated that the global financial crisis had impacted and damaged the banking sector to some 
extent.6 During the last global financial crisis, the total losses by the banks globally was 
estimated to be more than 1.8 trillion dollars, followed by insurance companies with around 
one trillion dollars loss. 
                                                           
3 http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 
4 The sale of loans is forbidden in Islam even if there are non interest loans.  
5 According to the financial Shariah jurisprudence, when the IBs are involved in financing the economy, there are 
more than one level of Mudarabah between two parts. The first level or single layer of Mudarabah is between the 
bank and the depositor of saving; the bank is the first Mudarib and the saver is the capital owner. The multiple 
layer Mudarabah appears when the bank as a financier contracts an entrepreneur which is the second Mudarib. 
For more details on the Mudarabah levels see Hasan (2016, 2010), and Hassan and Lewis (2007).  
6 According to AlKholi (2009), during the first nine months of 2009, the profitability of Saudi banks indicated a 
tenuous decline around 2.6% (18.86 billion Riyals in 2009 versus 19.37 billion Riyals in 2008). He showed that 
Al-Bilad Bank and Saudi British bank recorded losses respectively at 66% and 11%; the losses of Al-Bilad Bank 
would be more related to local factors. The Saudi banks have been supported by SAMA to absorb the local shocks 
of international financial crisis and the banks reserves have been increased by more than three times to face the 
loan losses. 
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The importance of this paper stems from the stability of Saudi Islamic banks in response to 
financial shocks, therefore it was expected that the adoption of the PLS system would 
contribute positively to global financial stability. This paper is significant to the literature of 
banking stability for the following contributions; firstly, we use quarterly data, whereas a lot 
of previous papers used yearly data set. Secondly, we consider the statistical properties of the 
data by testing for the stationary of both the variables and residuals of the long-run equation, 
whereas the main related literature disregards such properties. Furthermore, we focused on the 
country analysis (banks operating in Saudi Arabia), hence the results obtained are more robust 
and reliable, avoiding the exogeneity biases of the double panel regression (at countries and 
banks levels). A more reliable conceptual contribution consists of suggesting an alternative 
measure to z-score by which IBs perceives the financial stability through liquid and illiquid 
assets of banks.7   
The Section 2 part of this paper reviews the empirical literature on financial stability of 
banks. Section 3 exhibits the data set and analyze their statistical properties. A detailed 
examination of the banking stability measure and its modeling, including the main discussion 
of the results, are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and reveals some policy 
implications.   
 
2. Literature review 
There are few papers using quantitative models to analyze the financial stability of the Islamic 
and conventional banks. Cihak and Hesse (2010, 2008) analyzed, using z-score as a criterion 
of stability, a sample of twenty countries extracted from the BankScope database, which 
contain both the Islamic and conventional banks. The Islamic banks are classified into small 
and large banks following their assets-size with a threshold of one billion dollars and having at 
least 1% of the total assets of banks in the country. The findings of Cihak and Hesse exhibited 
that small Islamic banks are more stable than small conventional banks and large Islamic banks 
while large conventional banks are more stable than large Islamic banks. Their findings did not 
show if the large conventional banks are less stable than small Islamic banks. Nevertheless, the 
Islamic banks could be affected positively or negatively by financial crisis or bankruptcy of 
conventional banks even if the Islamic banks operate with its assets following the Islamic 
financing. The Standard & Poor's Credit Rating indicated that the Islamic financial institutions 
satisfy 15% of the needs of Muslims for financial services, and that the size of assets compatible 
to Islamic-Shariah reaches 400 billion dollars in 2009 i.e. approximately 10% of the global 
financial market, which is around 4 trillion dollars. The extension of the Islamic finance model 
inside a mixed banking system of the world could improve the financial stability, but probably 
reduce the immunity of Islamic banks. 
The study of Hasan and Dridi (2010) showed the effects of recent global financial crisis, 
especially during the period (2007-2008), on both conventional and Islamic banks of eight 
countries, including countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Using a range of 
banking indicators such as profitability, loan growth, asset growth and the external credit 
rating, they find that Islamic banks were also affected by the crisis, but in a different way 
                                                           
7 The empirical analysis using this alternative measure will be addressed in another paper.  
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compared to conventional banks. The profit realized by Islamic banks during 2008 was 
absorbed by the negative impact of the international financial crisis. Also, the growth rate of 
credits and investments assets (loans granted in the PLS system) exhibited that the performance 
of Islamic banks were better compared to the conventional banks, given the large losses 
incurred by conventional banks following the crisis. Stability was soon returned to the Islamic 
banks as each contributed to realize financial stability within the time. Nonetheless, the Islamic 
banks have some weaknesses related to their risk management that exposes the banks to 
potential financial shocks, hence the need for a reliable financial instruments to resolve the risk 
management above all liquidity risk. 
The study of Imam and Kpodar (2010) identified the factors affecting the global expansion 
of Islamic banks, which, in case of success, could be a new alternative financial model for the 
finance industry. They listed factors such as ‘‘population of Muslim per country, technology 
of the domestic financial system, competitiveness of the domestic financial system, average 
per capita income, real interest rate, events of 11 September 2001, crude oil price, and 
integration degree to Middle East countries’’ to be responsible for the global expansion of the 
Islamic banks. The findings show that the average per capita income and the competitiveness 
in the banking system have significant positive impact on the spread of Islamic banks, thus 
expressing the increase need for Islamic financial intermediation across the world. In addition, 
they also showed that the decrease in real interest rates -less than 3.5% increased the deposits 
in Islamic banks. The study of Ariss (2010) focused on the competitiveness between Islamic 
and conventional banks using several indicators which Panzar and Rosse (PR, 1987) described 
as the H-statistic index and the Lerner index (market power of bank). Using annual data from 
2000 to 2006, she indicated that the weak competitiveness between CBs and IBs is positively 
and significantly related to the higher level of profitability, and that traditional banks are more 
competitive than Islamic banks.     
Abedifar et al. (2013) showed at a panel level that small IBs are more stable compared to 
small CBs and that there is little evidence that the IBs charge rents to their customers. In 
contrast to such findings, our empirical work at a national level in Saudi Arabia exhibits that 
small IBs, such as Bank Al-Bilad, appear to be less stable. Consequently, it is not evident that 
the IBs have lower credit risk. Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) found, via parametric framework, 
that the IBs are stable even during the international financial crisis. However using the 
nonparametric analysis, the results were inconclusive because the Wilcoxon test implies a loss 
of power in comparison to the parametric test (Twomey and Viljoen 2004).8 By analyzing the 
banking market efficiency of the GCC region using the yearly data of the period of 2000-2013, 
Alqahtani and Mayes (2018) revealed at a panel level that in the long run CBs are more stable 
than IBs. It remains that the differences in the reaction to shocks between IBs and CBs are an 
empirical question.9 
The adoption of the PLS system by several banks around the world may therefore be 
proposed to have contributed positively to international financial stability and to a reduction in 
                                                           
8 Wilcoxon test mobilizes the rank of the observations instead of the real values, this implies a less efficiency in 
comparison to the parametric tests (Twomey and Viljoen 2004).     
9 In Appendices Figures 1 of z-score and assets visualize clearly the impacts of the global financial crisis on each 
bank of the Saudi banking system.     
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the volatility of global financial markets (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 2013). One 
possible explanation of the relatively better performance in terms of stability during the recent 
international financial crisis is the higher capitalization and liquidity reserves of Islamic banks. 
Another potential explanation is the partial integration of Islamic banks into the global financial 
system, given that Islamic banks are prohibited from dealing with the sale of derivatives and 
loans (Hassan 2006). For these reasons, the expansion of Islamic finance, and its further 
integration into the global banking system, could clearly reduce the immunity, thereby 
exposing Islamic banks to future financial contagions from conventional banks. 
Farooq et al. (2015) used the quarterly data of 40 banks in Pakistan (from Q2 2002 to Q1 
2010) consisting of 21 CBs, 6 IBs and 13 mixed banks were analyzed, considering two versions 
of the z-score index depending on whether the IBs treated PLS saving and investments (S&I) 
accounts as liabilities or as equity.10 On the basis that PLS was considered as part of the equity 
(capital), Farooq et al. (2015) found that IBs show sound financial stability with better asset 
quality than CBs. This outcome is also well-documented by Rashid et al. (2017). On the other 
hand, at the branches level based on the structure where PLS is considered as liabilities in IBs, 
they exhibited that the IBs branch z-score index was lower than that of conventional part of the 
mixed banks. Therefore, they concluded that the presence of Islamic finance system improves 
the financial stability.11  
Dawood et al. (2016) used a dynamic model of z-score to capture the persistency of the 
bank behavior about financial stability. After the international financial crisis, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision introduced a new regulatory framework. It comprises 
dealing with financial instability using two new regulatory tool-measures; checking on funding 
stability as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The 
Islamic Financial Services Board agreed to the new rules by the Basel III accord, but however, 
modified the last measure so that it conforms to the Islamic banking features. Using a panel 
data from 136 IBs between 2000 and 2013, Dawood et al. (2016) showed that the NSFR has a 
significant positive effect on the IBs stability index. This result qualifies the NSFR as tool for 
controlling the soundness of IBs. However, they also exhibited a negative effect of size-NSFR 
interaction on z-score. There is a contradiction between the negative z-score-NSFR correlation 
and the positive estimate of the parameter associated to NSFR in explaining z-score.12      
Most previous research used annual data. Hence by using quarterly data this paper 
immensely contributes to enrich the previous research, modeling the financial stability of banks 
in face of shocks due to financial crises. Firstly, the panel data features sample from 2005 to 
2011 represents an important part of 64% of the Saudi banking sector including Islamic and 
conventional banks and covering close to two thirds of banks whose shares are traded on the 
                                                           
10 When the PLS S&I accounts are considered as equity, the capital asset ratio (CAR or 𝑘) tends to be greater than 
when such accounts are treated as liabilities. It is not obvious that the z-score index will be greater in the first 
case, because it depends on the volatility of the return on assets ratio.  
11 A detailed review of the literature related to the financial stability in Islamic finance is descriptively well-
documented in Belouafi et al. (2015).  
12 In contrast to the regression analysis, the correlation analysis works with random variables without distinction 
between dependent and explanatory variables, but the algebraic signs of the partial estimate and the correlation 
coefficient are the same. Gideon (2010) proved the similar signs between coefficients-based correlation and 
estimates slopes-based regression. 
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Saudi stock market; and secondly, the sample contains the events of the recent global financial 
crisis (2007-2009). 
 
3. Banks Data and tests 
Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the Gulf Council Countries region, depending on oil 
export around the world. The reliance on foreign demand made the Saudi economy vulnerable 
to any international financial or economic crises (Woertz 2008). The oil revenues are the main 
financial sources which directly affecting deposits and liquidity in Saudi banks. The 45th 
economic report of SAMA (2009) indicates that foreign investments of Saudi banks reached a 
high record during 2009. The increasing international liquidity to GDP from 2005 reveals that 
the Saudi banks invest their excess liquidity abroad (Ghassan et al. 2013).  
Saudi banking sector consists of a total of eleven banks, categorized into two distinguished 
groups - Islamic and conventional banks. Four banks are classified as Islamic banks, according 
to the non-interest financing practice of these group of banks.13 The rest seven banks are 
conventional banks. For the purpose of this paper, a sample of six banks were selected, two 
Islamic banks (Al-Rajhi and Al-Bilad banks), and four conventional banks (Riyad bank, Saudi 
Investment bank, Saudi British bank, and Saudi American bank). The last two represent 
offshore banks, having close links to international banks around the world, and hence allow the 
investigation into the impacts of global financial crisis on these banks and the Saudi financial 
system.14  
The stability index (z-score) in sub-annual level is calculated using quarterly data collected 
and constructed from the Saudi financial market “Tadawul” over the period of 2005-2011.15 
The last financial crisis revealed some weaknesses in the Saudi banking system, chiefly among 
which are: high concentration of bank loans to a limited number of firms and individuals; large 
portion of banks’ investment in foreign assets with relatively high rates of returns compared to 
the returns on domestic assets, especially after lowering the reverse repo by SAMA; the lack 
of new government bonds during the same period, and finally the channeling of surplus 
liquidity into the international markets (Ghassan et al., 2011).  
Global financial crisis has caused some of the Saudi banks to incur losses, particularly those 
involved in foreign investment, loans trade, speculation in foreign currency and gold markets, 
and financial derivatives deals. To mediate the effects of the global financial meltdown, banks 
became relatively more conservative in issuing new loans. Despite the global financial crisis, 
the Saudi banking sector through the new conservation policy showed some healthy signs 
during this period, where its usual profit record level was maintained. Net profits declined only 
by approximately 2.6% after the conservative measures taken by banks. As a precautionary 
                                                           
13 This link “http://www.halal2.com/main.asp?id=71” specifies Islamic and non-Islamic features of firms and 
banks registered in Saudi stock market. 
14 Firstly, the number of Saudi banks in the largest economy of the GCC region appears to be too small. As the 
Saudi banking system is a hybrid system, we select two banks from each pattern. The first banks declaring the 
adoption of Shariah compliance finance are Al-Rajhi bank and Al-Bilad Bank founded in 1976 and 2005, 
respectively. The two national CBs are Riyad Bank (1957) and Saudi Investment Bank (1976). The sample 
includes also two international CBs namely the Saudi British Bank (1978) and Saudi American Bank (1980).  
15 Source: http://www.tadawul.com.sa. The international database BankScope allows only annual data.  
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action, to meet any possible losses due to investors’ defaults on banks’ loans, total reserves, 
voluntarily, have been boosted to 6.04 billion Riyals, over the period January to September 
2009, compared with 1.58 billion Riyals a year before.  
It was also noticed during this period that the equities of Saudi banks have increased, and 
the banks’ assets have not suffered the drastic negative impacts that hit the banking sector in 
industrial countries around the world, where some giant famous banks were forced to announce 
bankruptcy. Saudi banks’ huge reserves, most likely have shielded domestic banks against the 
tremendous negative impacts of international financial crisis. Moreover, some well-known 
international credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, reported that basic 
financial forecasts of the Saudi banking sector are relatively stable, flexible and had the ability 
to absorb negative shocks of the international financial crisis and the declining world economic 
growth.   
The prior step is to implement the panel unit root test on the relevant variables given in 
equation (2) below (See Descriptive statistics, Tables 1).16 The widely used panel unit root tests 
are Hadri (1999) as a common root test and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) as an individual 
root test. The Hadri test considers the null hypothesis of no unit root and assumes that 
persistence parameters are common i.e. identical in the panel data. Accordingly, it assumes a 
common process of the panel unit root under null hypothesis (ρ
𝑖
=ρ, 𝑖=1, … , 6) considering this 
process for panel data 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 where 𝜀𝑖𝑡is the specific-individual error, 𝑡 stands 
for a time-trend which is related to fixed or individual effects. Similar, to KPSS test, this test 
depends on the residuals from the individual OLS regressions on the constant and time-trend. 
The statistic LM1 is formed allowing for homoscedasticity hypothesis and alternatively the 
statistic ML2 is related to consistent heteroscedasticity assumption, which leads to 𝑍-statistic 
values (Table 2.2 in Tables 2). The IPS test considers the null hypothesis of unit root and 
supposes that the persistent coefficient may vary between banks. Accordingly, it assumes an 
individual process of the panel unit root under null hypothesis (ρ
𝑖
=0, 𝑖=1, … , 6) and considering 
a following individual Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) regression for each bank:   
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The average of the t-statistics of ρ
𝑖
 from the individual ADF regressions is adjusted to 
calculate 𝑡?̅?𝑇 statistics. When the lag order 𝑝𝑖is non-zero for some cross-sections, the IPS test 
shows that a properly standardized 𝑡?̅?𝑇 i.e. 𝑊?̅?𝑁𝑇statistic follows asymptotically a standard 
normal distribution (Table 2.1 in Tables 2). The results of the unit root panel test indicated that 
banks’ variables have unit root using either IPS or Hadri test. This finding suggests that the 
bank’s variables would be cointegrated. The results of unit root tests also exhibited that banking 
sector and macroeconomic variables are not stationary except the economic growth variable. 
 
                                                           
16 The panel unit test is more sensible to high autocorrelation, which involves appropriate lag length in the test 
equation. Hadri test has a different procedure for choosing the lag length; it requires the choice of kernel method 
estimation and bandwidth method to weighting the auto-covariances by selecting the small ones.  
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4. Stability index Model 
4.1 Banks Financial Stability Measurement 
There are several well-known methods of measuring the stability of financial systems 
particularly in the banking sector. Among these methods are, Value at Risk (VaR) (Holton 
2003, Manganelli and Engle 2001), Stress Test (Aragonés et al. 2001, BIS 2000) and z-score 
model (Altman 1983). The latter is considered the best amongst all other methods, as it has the 
advantage of predicting the possibilities of future bank insolvency, while other methods just 
find out if the bank may face a liquidity problem.   
In general, insolvency is a more serious and dangerous problem than liquidity, it is state 
where the bank liabilities exceed its assets, at which state the bank become insolvent. A bank 
may become illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets are held in illiquid assets (long term 
financial assets or real assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost. The bank may be forced 
to sell such assets at considerable loss, by selling it lower than its nominal value.  
The Altman measurement can be applied to both conventional and Islamic banks as well, 
using the banks’ accounting data. Assuming a normally distributed bank return μ, defining 
insolvency as a state where losses (−𝑅) exceed equity (𝐸) i.e. −𝑅 ≥ 𝐸 ⇔ 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸 ⟹
𝑅
𝐴
≤
−
𝐸
𝐴
, then the probability of default is       
𝑝(μ ≤ −𝑘) = ∫ N(0,1)dμ
−k
−∞
⟺ 𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸
𝐴
) = 𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
− 𝜇𝑅
𝐴
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸
𝐴
+ 𝜇𝑅
𝐴
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
= −𝑧) = Φ(−𝑘) 
where Φ is called z-score corresponding to tail-distribution or exceedance. A significant low 
z-score for a bank indicates that this bank is closer to insolvency. The z-score for banks can be 
defined at quarterly frequency as: 
 
𝑧𝑡:𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡:𝑞 + 𝜇𝑡
𝜎
                                                                (1) 
                  𝑘𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝐸
𝐴
)
𝑡:𝑞
,  𝜇1,𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝑅𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
   or    𝜇2,𝑡:𝑞 =
?̅?𝑡:𝑞
?̅?𝑡:𝑞
  ,    𝜎2 = 𝑉 (
𝑅
𝐴
)
𝑡:𝑞
            
Where 𝑘 is the ratio of equity capital plus total reserves to assets. μ is the ratio of average 
returns to assets, where average returns are calculated based of four observations per year; we 
use the first formula. σ stands for the standard deviation of returns to assets and measures the 
volatility of returns on assets.17 The bank’s z-score stability index is used for predicting 
financial distress. It is based on a standard indicator of financial soundness of a group of 
different financial institutions and focuses on bank’s risk of insolvency.18 The z-score reflects 
                                                           
17 Strobel (2010) shows that a best measure of standard deviation require high frequency such branch banks data.   
18 In fact, insolvency is a more serious problem than liquidity, in which case the bank liabilities exceed its assets, 
or the bank become insolvent. A bank may become illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets are held in illiquid 
assets (long term financial assets or real assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost. The bank may be forced 
to sell such assets at considerable loss, by selling it  lower than its nominal value. The concept of financial distress, 
widely used to make financial analysis of banks data, indicates the negative performance of banks. The case of 
financial distress occurs when the bank becomes insolvent even if bank assets exceed its liabilities.  
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the probability of insolvency, the point where the bank liabilities exceed assets. The z-score 
measures the number of standard deviations that a return realization has to fall to deplete its 
equity (Cihak 2007). Therefore, a greater z-score indicates a lower likelihood of bank 
insolvency; the index value will be high when capitalization, measured in terms of risk error, 
is large.  
The z-score seems to be an appropriate tool for measuring risk in Islamic banks, because it 
is not affected by the nature of the bank activities; it focuses only the on risks involved in the 
investment of bank assets and reserves. It is especially suitable for banks adopting investment 
strategies that prefer high risk assets given a high rate of return, or low risk assets even at low 
rate of returns, which guarantees the z-score objectivity (Cihak and Hesse 2010, 2008; 
Maechler et al. 2005). But in the context of financial shocks and crises, high risk investments 
may result to a negative return, whilst small risks may turn to big returns. These volatilities 
require a specific modeling of z-score index to explain its determinants in the long run such as 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models.  
Moreover, the z-score index may also be incompatible with the nature of Islamic banking 
relying mainly on the PLS system, which leads to a common risk of the investor and bank via 
“Mudarabah” and “Musharakah” contracts. It is probable that the capital value and reserves 
do not reflect the financial strength of Islamic banks, because the investors were expected to 
bear a part of the risk according to a formula of PLS contracts, and thus reduce fairly the risk 
of Islamic Banks. These banks may seek for adjustment processes in risk-taking rates by the 
investors through appropriate contracts of PLS system and new methods of capital investment. 
The conventional banks also seek for adjustment processes of interest rates on deposits and 
loans to avoid insolvency (Cihak and Hesse 2010, 2008).  
The z-score may not be appropriate for measuring the risk of cooperative and Islamic banks, 
because the returns on assets depend on the nature of their activities and financing modes. We 
can focus on the risks involved through the investment of these banks both in liquid and illiquid 
assets, since IBs adopt only financial Shariah compliant-contracts as the PLS system, it 
therefore made these banks closer to the real economy. By considering their illiquid assets, we 
have suggested that the new measure labelled g-score, associated to real economic growth, 
reflects multiple risks and allows to track the banking stability (For more details see Ghassan 
2017).  
Following the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) of Basel III (2010) which considers both 
assets and liabilities of banks, we suggest using the g index as an indicator of bank risks related 
to liquidity and leverage due to its randomness. To display the impact of illiquid assets as long-
run investments on bank stability, it would be more accurate to consider the stock-based g-
score definition:  
                                           𝑔 =
𝐸(𝜃)
𝐴
+ 𝜇 (
IA
𝐴
)
𝜎 (
IA
𝐴
)
=
𝑟2
−1 + (1 − 𝑟1)
𝜎(1 − 𝑟1)
                                                       
where 𝑟1 = 𝐿𝐴 𝐴⁄  and 𝑟2 = 𝐴 𝐸⁄  where 𝑟1 is the liquid assets (𝐿𝐴) to assets (𝐴) ratio labelled 
LAR, its complement ratio is the illiquid assets (𝐼𝐴) ratio 𝐼𝐴 𝐴⁄ = 1 − 𝑟1) ; θ is the invested 
share of the deposits as a contribution in the bank capital; and 𝑟2 is the ratio of assets to equity 
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(𝐸) i.e. capital of bank and total reserves. The suggested stock-based g-score index reflects the 
long-run dynamics of the real investments of the banks. This index could be associated to the 
habitual flow-based z-score by focusing on the returns on illiquid assets. Instead of measuring 
the returns on all assets, we can restrict the measurement to returns of only illiquid assets i.e. 
long-term assets, which depend more on the real economic growth. The complementarity of 
the two indices could be a road map of the banking stability (Ghassan 2017).    
 
4.2 Financial Stability Model 
The financial stability index is influenced by three sets of variables related to banks, banking 
sector and macroeconomic, respectively. The bank determinants include these five variables: 
logarithm of z-score (LZSCOR), logarithm of total assets (LAST), loans to assets ratio for 
conventional banks or ratio of finance activity to assets in case of Islamic banks (ratio of credits 
to assets, RCA),19 ratio of operating costs to income (RCI) and income diversity (IDV).20  The 
banking sector has two variables which are: logarithm of Herfindahl-Hirschman index (LHHI), 
which measures banks’ competitiveness, that ranges between zero for highly competitive and 
10000 for a least competitive market (Ariss 2010). It also includes the share of Islamic banks 
i.e. ratio of Islamic banks’ assets to total assets of the banking sector (SHIB_A), which may 
also be measured by the ratio of Islamic banks’ deposits to total bank sector deposits (SHIB_D). 
The macro variables are both real rate of economic growth (GRW) and rate of inflation (INF).   
To capture the impacts of a specific bank on financial banking stability, two bank dummy 
variables were introduced, one for conventional banks (CBD) and the other for Islamic banks 
(IBD). These variables are expected to take on a negative sign indicating the financial weakness 
of the related bank group, whereas a positive sign reflecting the financial strength of the related 
bank group and its contribution to the banking sector stability. It is also possible to use a 
composed variable in testing the hypothesis that ‘‘Islamic banks contribute to the financial 
stability of the banking sector’’. The IDV variable interacts with both dummy variables IBD 
and CBD. If the interaction with IBD takes on a positive sign, it implies that the diversity of 
Islamic banks’ income enhances the stability of the banking sector. 
Given that cross-section observations are less than the time series observations (𝑁 < 𝑇), 
and assuming the existence of serial correlation between banks’ data, the unobserved random 
errors are expected to have variance covariance matrix Ω ⊗ 𝑇, with Ω = (𝜎𝑖𝑗), 𝑖, 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝑁 where 𝜎𝑖𝑗 is not necessarily equal to zero (Heij et al. 2004). These features require 
using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model, which leads to formulating a pooled 
data model and the use of several estimation techniques of z-score model.21  
                                                           
19 Instead of interest income (commissions) and interest charges used in conventional banks, we used finance 
income and finance charges for Islamic banks.  
20 We calculated the income diversity by 𝑖𝑑𝑣 = 1 − |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
|,  where the net interest 
income, for Islamic banks, includes positive and negative income flows related to many model of PLS system. 
The higher value of this index indicates a higher diversification of income.   
21 Such as the Pooled Least Square (PLS) method, without cross-section weights and using standard errors and 
covariances; the Generalized Pooled Least Squares (PGLS) method, with cross-section weights (correcting for 
both cross-section heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation) and using SUR errors and covariances; 
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Based on the previous determinants of financial stability, the z-score model could be written 
as follows:    
                             𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                           (2) 
where 𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 is the banks variables, 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝑡 represent banking sector and macroeconomic 
variables, respectively. We also used 𝐷𝑖 as dummy variable to exhibit the distinction between 
the impacts of conventional and Islamic banks on the financial distress of bank 𝑖. The term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
indicates the unobserved stochastic errors. The variables on the right side of Eq. (2) are 
considered with one lag length to capture their effects on the expected z-score index.   
Considering that the sum of the cross fixed effects is zero or very close to zero (bottom of 
Table 3), these effects appear in Figure 3 and represent the deviations from the global rate of 
z-score. The findings show that SIB, SAB banks and mainly BLD bank contribute positively to 
financial stability, whereas SAM and RJH banks and mostly RYD bank negatively impact the 
financial index stability. To exhibit the global effect on Saudi’s banking sector, we formulated 
a Panel data model using numerous estimation methods:22  
                                  𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (3) 
The fixed effects model allows to differentiate across individual units through the 
differences in the constant term. The equation (3) represents a fixed effects model when there 
is no random effect in the parameter 𝛼𝑖. In this case, the fixed effects model lets us distinguish 
between the individual units via the differences in the constant term 𝛼𝑖. We can use the dummy 
variables by considering that 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=2  where 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 0  for  𝑖 = 1 and 𝑐𝑖𝑡 =
1  for  2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁. The parameter 𝛼1 is as the benchmark unit, and the differential intercept 
coefficients are 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛿𝑖 for  2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁. The Table 5 in Appendices shows the values of 
the parameter 𝛿𝑖 for each bank in the sample.  
The findings indicate that on the average Islamic banks reduce the financial stability index, 
but they contribute to financial stability in the banking sector through the income diversity 
index. The serial correlation due to the dummy variable (IBD) relativizes these results. The 
results of Table 4 have some goodness statistical features; they show that Islamic banks 
contribute to improving financial stability with an average rate of 8.3% (i.e. 0.309
3.717
) through the 
diversification of financial products.23 As previously defined, the income diversity index of IBs 
is based on activity diversification and means that its increase indicates a properly diversified 
income. The contractual financing of IBs, through trading contracts (as Murabahah, Ijarah, 
Istisnaa) and contracts of participation (as Musharakah, Mudarabah, Muzaraah), prevents any 
                                                           
the P2GLS method, with cross-section weights and using SUR errors and covariances, and set of common, cross-
section specific and period specific instrumental variables.   
22 Obviously, when we consider panel banks, the fixed effects are less appropriate than the stochastic effects, but 
the small number of banks in our sample does not authorize such hypothesis. Another technical point consists of 
testing if the residuals of the long-run equation of z-score are stationary. This step was run to validate equations 
(2) and (3).      
23 By applying the same panel GLS estimation to the specific income diversity of CBs, in contrast to IBs we find 
a negative coefficient which means that marginally the CBs activity diversification does not contribute to the 
banking stability.   
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form of Riba (usury) and sharing the risks inherent in any contracts.24 In conventional finance, 
most authors supported that the more diversified credit unions have lower risk and return (Esho 
et al. 2005), and thus proposed that economic diversity reduces bank risk (Shiers 2002). We 
argue that if IBs focused on Marabahah, there is no real adhesion to the large spectrum of the 
Islamic finance in banks, and consequently there is less diversification which would lead to 
financial instability in IBs. 
The results presented in Table 5 from Panel GLS estimation indicate that the fixed cross 
effects on z-score vary between banks. Al-Bilad bank has the highest negative impact on z-
score compared to SIB which also performed more negatively than SAB (1.5% on average). On 
the other hand, the Riyad Bank has the highest significant positive contribution on the banking 
financial stability, SAMBA group enhances this stability significantly, and Al-Rajhi Bank has a 
slightly positive contribution (1.1% on average). In another point of view, looking at the 
LZSCORE Figures 1 (see Appendices), it could be observed that Riyad, SAMBA and Al-Rajhi 
banks appear to be more resilient to financial crisis than the other banks in the sample. By 
disregarding the other determinants of the banking stability, such resilience-differences are 
explained by the autonomous effects of the banks on the z-score index. It would be expected 
that since Al-Bilad bank is not sufficiently diversified, it cannot have a positive contribution to 
the banking stability. Although the economic and financial conditions of the economy and the 
related factors are important in measuring banking stability, yet the degree of risks of the banks, 
the degree of the competitiveness between banks, and the manner in which they manage their 
expected revenues are better determinants for the banking stability. From the estimation of 
equation (3), it appears that the variables of the banks, banking sector and macroeconomic 
variables significantly affected the financial stability to some extent. 
Table 4 indicates that the index of operating cost to income has a small effect to improve 
the financial stability index, so it is reduced slightly at rate 0.01%. But, Al-Bilad bank has a 
high and unstable ratio of cost to income, while Al-Rajhi Bank proved to be highly competitive 
over to Riyad Bank. This ratio appears to be more unstable and less competitive in both SIB 
and SAB. It also appears from Table 4 that the variables of banks have the expected signs, as 
the banks that have a high level of RCA variable move toward low index of financial stability 
(Table 5), such as Al-Bilad Bank and SIB. But it seems that the marginal propensity (0.622) 
associated to the ratio of loans to assets (for conventional banks) or to the ratio of finance to 
assets (for Islamic banks) has a significant positive sign, which emphasizes the effects of banks 
with moderate RCA ratios.   
The modest presence of Islamic banks in the Saudi banking sector does not qualify them to 
effectively improve banking or financial stability. The dominance of conventional banks 
reflects that they contribute to increase the z-score index, although some may experience 
financial distress as in SIB and SAB. But the presence of Islamic banks leads to a net 
improvement of the financial stability. The fixed cross effects (Table 3) exhibit that Al-Bilad 
                                                           
24 Concerning the Riba and interest concepts, there is a consensus that Riba concept is not restrictive as the interest 
concept. Because, the Riba can appear in any unfair transaction, but the rental price called interest rate on loans 
is involved specifically by financial transactions of banks (Algaoud and Lewis, Chapter 3 in Hassan and Lewis 
2007; Iqbal 2003). Both Riba and interest rate as a renting money lead to the concentration of wealth and then to 
economic and social inequalities (Al-Suwailem 2000). 
13 
 
 
bank, with small size compared to Al-Rajhi Bank, tend to better the z-score index, while Al-
Rajhi bank tends to reduce the Islamic financial stability index. These results may be explained 
by the involvement of Al-Rajhi bank, through the Profit-Loss Sharing system, in direct 
investment operations or long run and high risk financial investment intermediation. These 
results are similar in part to the findings of Cihak and Hesse (2010, 2008), that the small Islamic 
banks are more stable than the large ones. 
It seems that the impact of competitive bank index LHHI has a negative sign and high 
significant parameter, which indicates that the Saudi banking sector relatively displayed weak 
competition, reflecting a negative effect on the financial stability. In addition, the estimated 
equations exhibit that the inflation rate negatively and significantly affected the z-score index, 
which illustrates the importance of economic and financial policies of the government in 
support of the financial stability in banking system.  
Although this paper is focused on the banking stability in a mixed banking system, we find 
that generally there is no real distinction in term of stability between CBs and IBs, but there 
are some specific aspects related to the nature of the main activities of each bank that could 
improve or deteriorate the banking stability. Also, the subsample of IBs is not homogenous, 
the same remark holds for the CBs, this heterogeneity complicates the government treatment 
of banks in terms of financial policy. Another policy question that needs to be managed deeply 
in the long-run is to shift the competitiveness between CBs and IBs from negative to positive, 
and thus enhancing the banking stability. In addition, another aspect of the government policy 
which would foster loyal competitiveness between CBs and IBs is by eliminating the Islamic 
windows in the CBs to encourage more competition. We suggest that by increasing the number 
of IBs and encouraging income diversity of banks from the real sector of the economy, the 
financial market will work with more competitiveness, and thereby contribute more efficiently 
to the stability in the Saudi banking system. The foundation of the Shariah financial contracts 
would support IBs and CBs to overcome any banking challenges, but the wide variety of 
banking practices should be compliant to the Shariah finance and must diversify their banking 
activity as allowed by the large spectrum of the Islamic finance. Furthermore, we add that 
financial technology should be incorporated into IBs to improve the operation and 
implementation of Shariah financial contracts and thus enhance the connectedness between the 
banks in developing the inter-IBs market. Such connectedness would facilitate the running of 
macroprudential regulation of the financial stability through reliable information about banks 
activities.                           
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This article uses the z-score as financial distress index to analyze the stability of some selected 
conventional and Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. The financial stability model is explained 
using variables of the individual banks, banking sector and macroeconomic, respectively. The 
models are designed for both pooled and panel data and estimated by several methods. Pooled 
data model (see, Figure 3 and Figure 4) shows that SIB and SAB and Al-Bilad bank positively 
contribute to financial stability, with Al-Bilad making the highest contribution. On the other 
hand, the SAMBA group, Al-Rajhi Bank and Riyad bank have a negative impact on its financial 
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stability with Riyad having the highest negative impact. However, panel data model shows that 
Islamic banks relatively reduce banking stability index; meanwhile, they efficiently enhance 
the financial stability through the diversification of their assets. The fixed cross effects on z-
score indicate that Al-Bilad Bank had the highest negative contribution to the financial stability, 
followed by SIB and the SAB, the latter has the least negative impact on z-score. The findings 
indicate that Riyad Bank and SAMBA group efficiently support the financial stability of the 
banking sector, while Al-Rajhi bank has a positive but relatively moderate role in enhancing 
the banking sector stability.  
The findings also indicate that the operating cost-income ratio has a small role in improving 
the financial stability. Al-Bilad Bank has a high and unstable ratio of cost to income, while Al-
Rajhi Bank proved to be highly competitive over to Riyad Bank. This ratio appears to be more 
unstable and less competitive in both SIB and SAB. Conventional banks with high ratio of loans 
to assets or Islamic banks with high finance to assets ratio mostly have lower stability indices, 
for instance the Al-Bilad bank and SIB. However, this ratio has a positive and significant 
marginal propensity, which emphasizes the effects of banks with moderate ratios. The 
competitiveness index seems to be negatively high and strongly significant, which indicates 
that the Saudi banking sector has relatively less level of competitiveness, and therefore 
negatively affects the financial stability. The limited presence of Islamic banks in the Saudi 
banking sector threatens any effort to improve the financial stability.  
The overall results indicate that there is no real distinction in term of stability between CBs 
and IBs. The heterogeneity among Saudi banks complicates the impacts of any public financial 
measures aiming at achieving the financial stability. Since the competitiveness index 
negatively contributes to the financial stability, it is important for the financial and monetary 
authorities to run the required measures to encourage the competitiveness between CBs and 
IBs shifting it from negative to positive, and thus enhance banking stability. We suggest that 
the policy measure of eliminating Islamic windows in the CBs could boost more competition 
in the banking sector. In addition, by increasing the number of IBs and matching the income 
diversity of banks to the real economy, the banking market will contribute more efficiently to 
stability of banks. Moreover, we also suggested that improving the financial technology could 
foster the implementation of Shariah financial contracts and would improve the connectedness 
between banks in establishing an inter-IBs market. The development of the competitiveness 
and connectedness in banking system would successfully enhance running the macroprudential 
regulation of the financial stability.      
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Appendices 
Figures 1. Some Banks data (Log of z-score and Log of assets) 
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Tables 1. Descriptive statistics and Preliminary Tests  
 
Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics for LAST  
CROSSID Mean Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 11.858 11.816 0.226 0.019 1.330 
RYD_2 11.640 11.531 0.305 0.237 1.486 
SAB_3 11.426 11.377 0.289 -0.008 1.550 
SIB_4 10.683 10.678 0.155 -0.229 1.950 
RJH_5 11.721 11.734 0.249 -0.061 1.544 
BLD_6 9.434 9.638 0.319 -0.459 1.574 
All 11.127 11.428 0.889 -1.033 3.005 
Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics for LZSCOR 
CROSSID Mean Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 3.848 3.872 0.088 -0.588 2.122 
RYD_2 4.107 4.070 0.155 -0.025 2.482 
SAB_3 3.511 3.518 0.120 -0.333 2.129 
SIB_4 3.340 3.348 0.078 -0.272 2.292 
RJH_5 3.928 3.935 0.106 -0.393 2.637 
BLD_6 3.717 3.586 0.260 0.271 1.433 
All 3.742 3.797 0.296 -0.039 1.937  
 
 
Table 1.4. Descriptive Statistics for RCI 
CROSSID Mean Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 0.484 0.451 0.184 2.123 7.829 
RYD_2 0.868 0.735 0.453 2.260 7.207 
SAB_3 2.914 0.689 9.944 4.126 18.036 
SIB_4 -0.552 0.412 3.427 -1.663 5.249 
RJH_5 0.499 0.472 0.189 0.554 2.386 
BLD_6 14.619 3.213 39.916 2.683 8.498 
All 3.139 0.574 17.314 6.993 52.995  
Table 1.3. Descriptive Statistics for RCA 
CROSSID Mean Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 0.533 0.538 0.036 -0.566 2.829 
RYD_2 0.566 0.568 0.041 -0.969 4.065 
SAB_3 0.591 0.600 0.037 -0.301 1.719 
SIB_4 0.524 0.517 0.046 0.370 2.118 
RJH_5 0.862 0.869 0.015 -0.791 2.475 
BLD_6 0.809 0.874 0.104 -0.937 2.300 
All 0.647 0.596 0.146 0.663 1.843  
 
 
Table 1.5. Descriptive Statistics for IDV 
CROSSID Mean Quant.* Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. 
SAM_1 0.667 0.640 0.159 0.208 1.802 
RYD_2 0.668 0.690 0.149 -0.440 2.584 
SAB_3 0.725 0.711 0.132 0.410 1.904 
SIB_4 0.717 0.701 0.192 -0.498 2.597 
RJH_5 0.441 0.412 0.115 0.304 2.356 
BLD_6 0.709 0.719 0.086 -0.682 3.706 
All 0.655 0.684 0.171 -0.236 2.464  
                                                        Note: *Quantiles computed for p=0.5, using the Rankit (Cleveland) definition. 
 
Tables 2. Preliminary Tests  
 
                                                                  Table 2.1. Panel unit root 
IDV RCI RCA LAST LZSCOR  
IE, IT IE IE IE, IT IE Model 
-0.866 
(0.19) 
-0.398 
(0.34) 
-0.636 
(0.26) 
-0.773 
(0.22) 
-0.506 
(0.31) 
IPS W-stat 
(Prob.-value) 
    -1.713 
(-2.42) 
IPS t ̅-stat 
(Critical-value) 
NS NS NS NS NS Decision 
 
 
                                                              Table 2.2. Panel unit root 
IDV RCI RCA LAST LZSCOR  
IE IE, IT IE, IT IE, IT IE, IT Model 
4.020 
(0.0000) 
3.065 
(0.001) 
4.064 
(0.0000) 
2.817 
(0.002) 
2.968 
(0.0015) 
Hadri Z-stat 
(Prob.-value) 
3.436 
(0.0003) 
23.982 
(0.0000) 
3.312 
(0.0005) 
2.190 
(0.014) 
2.978 
(0.0015) 
Hadri HC_Z-stat 
(Prob.-value) 
NS NS NS NS NS Decision 
                             Note: IE, IT and NS are Individual Effects, Individual linear Trends  
                             and Non-Stationarity, respectively. 
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                     Table 3. Double GLS-SUR Estimation of z-score model 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR?   
Method: Pooled IV/Two-stage EGLS (Cross-section SUR) 
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Included observations: 19 after adjustments, Cross-sections included: 6  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 114  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Instrument list: c lhhi(-1) shib(-1) inf(-1) @cxinst last?(-1) rca?(-1) rci?(-1) 
idv?(-1)_ibd?(-1) 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11.44979 3.608446 3.173053 0.0021 
LHHI(-1) -0.697518 0.400972 -1.739566 0.0857 
SHIB(-1) 0.338608 1.026395 0.329900 0.7423 
INF(-1) -0.514414 1.170320 -0.439550 0.6614 
LAST_SAM(-1) -0.089445 0.108586 -0.823731 0.4125 
LAST_RYD(-1) 0.308048 0.161393 1.908682 0.0598 
LAST_SAB(-1) -0.241410 0.081078 -2.977523 0.0038 
LAST_SIB(-1) -0.316347 0.118227 -2.675763 0.0090 
LAST_RJH(-1) 0.189620 0.094400 2.008680 0.0479 
LAST_BLD(-1) -0.736098 0.103118 -7.138387 0.0000 
RCA_SAM(-1) 0.082126 0.558142 0.147141 0.8834 
RCA_RYD(-1) -0.724942 0.889108 -0.815359 0.4173 
RCA_SAB(-1) -1.489424 0.448639 -3.319869 0.0014 
RCA_SIB(-1) -0.104803 0.255478 -0.410222 0.6827 
RCA_RJH(-1) -0.337315 0.825487 -0.408625 0.6839 
RCA_BLD(-1) 0.052518 0.281525 0.186549 0.8525 
RCI_SAM(-1) 0.032819 0.077780 0.421954 0.6742 
RCI_RYD(-1) 0.003192 0.066286 0.048155 0.9617 
RCI_SAB(-1) 0.097760 0.076668 1.275112 0.2059 
RCI_SIB(-1) -0.001052 0.002741 -0.383748 0.7022 
RCI_RJH(-1) -0.446947 0.097857 -4.567328 0.0000 
RCI_BLD(-1) 0.000331 0.000484 0.683699 0.4961 
IDV_SAM(-1) 0.101979 0.125921 0.809865 0.4204 
IDV_RYD(-1) -0.187360 0.161289 -1.161646 0.2488 
IDV_SAB(-1) 0.030768 0.111730 0.275374 0.7837 
IDV_SIB(-1) -0.166351 0.052959 -3.141103 0.0024 
IDV_RJH(-1) -0.163738 0.134712 -1.215464 0.2277 
IDV_BLD(-1) 0.066311 0.270120 0.245485 0.8067 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)     
_SAM—C -0.652164    
_RYD—C -4.378241    
_SAB—C 1.614018    
_SIB—C 1.456042    
_RJH—C -3.141821    
_BLD—C 5.102171    
     
      Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.996480     Mean dependent var 51.41742 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995089     S.D. dependent var 16.43169 
S.E. of regression 1.151517     Sum squared resid 107.4053 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.721575     Instrument rank 33.00000 
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        Figures 2. Double GLS-SUR Residuals of z-score model 
 
 
                                   
                   Figure 3. Panel Fixed Effects using 2GLS-SUR method 
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                     Table 4. Panel GLS Estimation of z-score model 
Dependent Variable: LZSCOR   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Sample (adjusted): 2005Q2 2009Q4  
Cross-sections included: 6. Total panel observations: 114  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 518.6609 140.8547 3.682242 0.0004 
RCA(-1) 0.661983 0.053565 12.35854 0.0000 
RCI(-1) -0.000499 0.000284 -1.756318 0.0821 
IDV(-1) -0.278767 0.028729 -9.703381 0.0000 
LHHI(-1) -56.16464 15.41028 -3.644621 0.0004 
SHIB(-1) -87.79749 24.26524 -3.618241 0.0005 
LAST(-1) -0.209518 0.033495 -6.255232 0.0000 
IDV_IBD(-1) 0.309485 0.096961 3.191847 0.0019 
GRW(-1) -0.133255 0.056492 -2.358812 0.0203 
INF(-1) -3.341631 0.803610 -4.158273 0.0001 
     
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.999381     Mean dependent var 39.48141 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999294     S.D. dependent var 38.78086 
S.E. of regression 1.030454     Sum squared resid 105.1218 
F-statistic 11425.07     Durbin-Watson stat 1.309055 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
         Table 5. Cross-Section Fixed Effects on z-score using Panel GLS method  
CROSSID-Cste, Panel GLS Method Effect 
 Saudi American Bank (SAM, Cste)  0.402613 
 Riyad Bank (RYD, Cste)   0.590647 
 Saudi British Bank (SAB, Cste)  -0.055532 
 Saudi Investment Bank (SIB, Cste)  -0.332961 
 Al-Rajhi Bank (RJH, Cste)   0.039923 
 Al-Bilad Bank (BLD, Cste)  -0.644689 
 
   Figure 4. Standardized Residuals using Panel GLS method 
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